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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The District Court's Amended Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Amended Order") was entered on September 18, 2002 [Record
on Appeal ("R.") 109-114, Appellant's Addendum ("Aplt. Add.") j]. Pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Amended Order was certified as final as to the claims of
plaintiff-appellant R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc. ("McKell"), against defendantappellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), and Wells Fargo's claims against
McKell.1 (R. 112, 1 5) McKell timely filed its notice of appeal on October 4, 2002,
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(a). (R. 115-117) This Court has appellate jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

!

The Amended Order did not dispose of Wells Fargo's Counterclaim against McKell,
which alleged that Wells Fargo's Trust Deed had priority over McKell's mechanic's
lien (R. 31). Although the district court's Findings of Fact found that McKell
commenced work two days before Wells Fargo recorded its Trust Deed (R. 87, ^f 2,
3), there was no finding that this work constituted visible onsite work, as required in
order to give McKell's lien priority under Utah Code Ann., § 38-1-5. See, Ketchum,
Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mt. Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah
App. 1989), cert, den., Pollack v. Heritage Mt., 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
However, the Amended Order did finally dispose of McKell's First Claim for Relief
(R. 3-4), as against Wells Fargo and its co-defendants (R. 113, ^ 3), as required for
certification under Rule 54(b). Even though Wells Fargo's co-defendants were not a
party to Wells Fargo's motion, the district court made it clear that the court's ruling on
the motion would apply to the co-defendants as well [Transcript of June 26, 2002
hearing ("Tr."), pp. 3-4] . Excerpts of this Transcript cited herein are attached hereto
as Addendum ("Aple. Add.") A.
-1-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court correctly ruled that under Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-11(1)(a), the 12 month statute of limitations for filing an action to enforce a
mechanic's lien on non-residential property, "final completion of the original contract"
occurs when the contractor ceases and abandons the work to be performed under the
contract.
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law subject
to the de novo standard of review. See, Ketchum, supra, 784 P.2d at 1220. Also, the
appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any ground available to the district
court, even if not relied upon by the district court. See, Projects Unlimited, Inc. v.
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990).
Preservation of Issue: (R. 58-66)
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court correctly ruled, based on the
undisputed facts, that McKell did not file this action to enforce its mechanic's lien
within 12 months after McKell ceased and abandoned the work to be performed under
the contract.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. Summary judgment
will be affirmed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, or where, even
according to the facts alleged by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to
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judgment is a matter of law. See, Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526,
528-529 (Utah 1979).
Preservation of Issue: R. 58-66. To the extent that McKell is now arguing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether or when McKell ceased
and abandoned the work to be performed under the contract, this argument was not
raised in the district court [R. 58-66; Tr. generally], is therefore waived, and may not
be considered by the appellate court.2 See, Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945
P.2d 125, 129-130 (Utah App. 1997), cert, den., 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
However, the appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any ground available to
the district court, even if not relied upon by the district court. See, Projects Unlimited,
supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wells Fargo generally agrees with McKell's Statement of the Case,
describing the nature of the case, and the course of proceedings and disposition in the
district court, except as set forth below.
Wells Fargo denies that its deed of trust was not recorded until after McKell
started visible onsite work (R. 31). Also, one of Wells Fargo's arguments in the
district court was that the 12-month statute of limitations began to run no later than

2

At oral argument in the district court, the only factual issue McKell attempted to raise
was whether and when final completion of the contract occurred according to McKell's
interpretation of the statute of limitations, not whether and when McKell had abandoned
the contract (Tr. 28, Aple. Add. A).
-3-

November 2, 2000, based upon McKell1s admission, discussed below, that it recorded
its notice of lien on that date because it knew defendant Carter Construction
Development, L.L.C. ("Carter"), the owner of the real property with whom McKell
contracted, was unwilling or unable to pay McKell for work McKell had already done
(R. 71-72). Although not reflected in the district court's written Findings and
Conclusions (R. 83-89), at oral argument, the district court's verbal ruling adopted this
argument as an alternative ground for granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary
judgment (Tr. 28, 43-44, Aple. Add. A). 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wells Fargo generally agrees with McKell's Statement of Facts, except as set
forth below.
Paragraphs. With respect to Paragraph 5 of McKell's Statement of Facts,
neither the district court's Finding of Fact No. 3 (R. 87), nor Paragraph 5 of the
Affidavit of Gordon Erickson dated May 16, 2002 ("Erickson Aff.," R. 59), upon
which that Finding was based, establish when McKell first performed visible onsite
work.
Paragraphs 9 and 10. Paragraph 10 of McKell's Statement of Facts is based
on Paragraph 12 of the Erickson Aff., and Paragraph 9 of McKell's Statement of Facts

3

This verbal ruling is as much a part of the district court's decision as the court's
written Findings and Conclusions. See, Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177
(UtahApp. 1990).
-4-

is based on the district court's Finding of Fact No. 7, which in turn is based on
Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. (R. 58, 87, 97, Aplt Add. h, i). Paragraph 12 of the
Erickson Aff. claims that McKell intended to complete its work under the contract upon
payment for work already done, and guaranty of the availability of funds for payment
of the work remaining to be done.
Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. claims that prior to November 2, 2000,
McKell negotiated with Carter concerning payment for work McKell performed prior
to October 5, 2000. Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. further contends that McKell
recorded its mechanic's lien on November 2, 2000, "... [w]hen Carter would not, or
could not, pay for the portion of work completed..."
There is no evidence, either in the Erickson Aff. or anywhere else in the
record, that after November 2, 2000, McKell made any attempt to negotiate further
with Carter, concerning either payment for McKell's past work, or assurances of
payment for future work by McKell. Thus, it is undisputed that, based upon McKellfs
inability to reach agreement with Carter concerning payment for McKell's past or
future work, McKell abandoned the contract no later than November 2, 2000.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While there is no Utah law directly on point, Utah cases interpreting prior
versions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) support the district court's interpretation of
the current version of this statute of limitations (or more accurately, statute of repose).
Under those cases, a contractor completes a contract on the date the contractor stops its
-5-

work under the contract, as reflected in the notice of lien. Also, the majority of
jurisdictions considering the issue have held that cessation of work or abandonment of a
project constitutes completion of the work on that project, for purposes of a mechanic's
lien statute of limitation that, like the Utah statute of repose, begins to run from the
time of completion of work.
To hold otherwise would mean that the statute of repose never begins to run
in cases, as here, where the project is never completed. Mechanic's lien claimants, like
McKell here, could cloud title to a property forever, without being forced to file suit to
establish the validity of their claim, which defeats the whole purpose of the statute of
repose.
Here, as the district court ruled, the 12-month statute of repose started to run
either when McKell ceased work on the project on October 5, 2000, or no later than
November 2, 2000, when it became clear to McKell that Carter would not, or could
not, pay for work McKell had already completed, let alone any future work, and
McKell recorded its notice of lien. Thus, by the time McKell filed this action on
November 21, 2001, its claim was time barred by the 12-month statute of repose.
McKell argues that it intended to complete the project, subject to two
conditions, i.e., payment for past work and assurance of payment for future work.
McKell also argues that the issues of if and when it abandoned the project are factual
issues that should have precluded summary judgment.

-6-

However, McKell never raised this alleged factual dispute in the district
court, and therefore waived it for purposes of this appeal. Moreover, even if McKell
had raised this issue, there is no evidence in the record that after McKell recorded its
notice of lien on November 2, 2000, McKell made any further effort to pursue the two
conditions it claims would have led to its resumption of work (i.e., payment for past
work and assurance of payment for future work). Thus, based upon the undisputed
facts in the record, McKell abandoned the project no later than November 2, 2000, and
its mechanic's lien claim was time barred no later than November 2, 2001.
Accordingly, the district court's Amended Order should be affirmed, and
Wells Fargo should be awarded its attorney fees and costs as the successful party on
this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(1)(a), FINAL COMPLETION OF
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT OCCURS WHEN THE CONTRACTOR CEASES AND ABANDONS THE WORK TO BE
PERFORMED UNDER THE CONTRACT

A. Utah Case Law.
In Utah, like most jurisdictions, the statutory period for bringing an action to
enforce a mechanic's lien is jurisdictional, may not be waived, and is therefore a statute
of repose rather than a statute of limitations. See, AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev.
and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-292 (Utah 1986). One reason for making the
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statutory limitation period jurisdictional is to "...strictly [limit] the time during which
property is encumbered... ." Id. at 292 (citation omitted)
The mechanic's lien claimant has the burden of establishing that it has
brought its action within the limitation period. See, Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 (Utah App. 1990). In Govert, a painting contractor
contracted with a homeowner to paint his home. The contractor stopped work on
February 14, 1986, before the painting was done, because the home, which was under
construction, had not yet been completed. The contractor and the owner agreed that
the contractor would leave paint so that the owner could complete the job.
A payment dispute arose, and the contractor recorded notice of mechanic's
lien on February 25, 1986, listing February 14, 1986 as the date upon which the last
work was performed and the last materials were furnished. The contractor filed suit to
foreclose the lien on June 23, 1987. The version of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 in
effect at the time, provided that actions to enforce mechanic's liens, '...must be begun
within twelve months after completion of the original contract, or the suspension of
work thereunder for a period of thirty days.' 801 P.2d at 172 (quoting statute, emphasis
added) The contractor contended that its lawsuit was timely because the paint it had
left for the owner was not used until some time after July 1, 1986.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute started to run when the
contractor stopped work, even though the work was incomplete: "The Utah Supreme
Court has held that when a contractor finishes his or her work on a job, the statutory
-8-

period begins to run." 801 P.2d at 173 [citing AAA Fencing, which stated "The time
for enforcing mechanics' liens set out in section 38-1-11 ... limits a lienor's rights to
twelve months after his work is completed." (714 P.2d at 292, emphasis added)]
In Govert the Court of Appeals, like the district court did here, relied on the
statement in the notice of lien that the last work was performed and the last materials
were furnished on February 14, 1986, in holding that the statute started to run on that
date, and that the lien claim was time barred:
Significantly the notice of lien lists February 14, 1986,
as the date the last work was performed and materials
furnished. Thus, Copier Painting had completed the
performance on its primary contract on February 14,
1986, and the statutory period began to run on that date.
Accordingly Copier Painting's filing of this action on
June 23, 1987, was untimely under section 38-1-11 as it
was not filed within twelve months of the completion of
the original contract.
801 P.2d at 1734
Wells Fargo is not aware of any reported Utah cases interpreting the present
version of § 38-1-1 l(l)(a), or of any legislative history pertaining to the language at
issue here,5 However, the only significant difference between the statutory language at
4

See also, Projects Unlimited, supra, 798 P.2d at 741-742, 751 (12 month period under
§ 38-1-11 started to run when contractor ceased work before completion, on date set
forth in notice of lien).

5

Wells Fargo's reply memorandum in the district court mistakenly indicated that the
present version of § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) was enacted in 2001, and omitted one of the historical amendments to the statute that was made in 1994 (R. 73, n.l). The present version
of the statute was enacted in 1995, and the present and historical versions of the statute
are set forth in McKelfs opening brief at pp. 1-2, 6-7 and Aplt. Add. a through g.
-9-

issue in the above cases, and the present statute, is that under the present statute the
12-month period begins to run from "final completion" of the original contract, rather
than from "completion" of the original contract, and the present version of the statute
deletes the provision allowing the 12-month period to begin to run 30 days after
suspension of work under the original contract.
Wells Fargo submits there is no meaningful distinction between "completion"
and "final completion," and that the above cases should be followed in interpreting the
present version of the statute.6 Under those cases, the district court here correctly ruled
that "final completion" occurred when McKell stopped work on the project on
October 5, 2000, as set forth in its notice of lien, thereby making this action time
barred as a matter of law.
B,

Case Law From Other Jurisdictions.

The majority rule in cases from other jurisdictions is that abandonment of
work under a contract constitutes completion of work under that contract, for purposes

6

McKell argues that prior to the 1994 amendments to § 38-1-11, "completion" was
equated with "substantial completion." However, the case it cites deals with the
timeliness of a notice of lien under § 38-1-7, not the timeliness of a lien foreclosure
action under § 38-1-11. See, Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith
Assoc, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1992). In any event, the cases Wells Fargo
discusses above did not hold that the contract was substantially complete. They held
that the contract was entirely complete when the contractor stopped work (as opposed
to a temporary suspension of work). See, Govert, 801 P.2d at 163. Thus, McKellfs
reliance on Reliance Insur. Co. v. UtahDept. of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363, 1370
(Utah 1993), holding that substantial completion was not final completion, within the
meaning of a liquidated damages provision of a road construction contract, is similarly
misplaced.
-10-

of determining the timeliness of a mechanic's lien claim, under statutes measuring
timeliness based upon completion of work:
There is broad authority for a general rule that
abandonment is the equivalent of completion for
purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes: and under
statutes which require the notice, claim or statement of
mechanics' lien to be filed within a certain time after
completion of the building or improvement, it is, apart
from slight authority to the contrary, very generally held
or recognized that where the building or improvement is
not completed but work is abandoned thereon,
abandonment of the work is equivalent to completion for
the purposes of the statute, and that the filing both may
and, in order to be timely, must be made within the
statutory period after such abandonment.
Carson Construction & Design, Inc. v. Mott & Assoc, P.C., 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS
74, *5-*6 (Aple. Add. B hereto), quoting Abandonment of Construction or of Contract
as Affecting Time for Filing Mechanics1 Liens or Time for Giving Notice to Owner,
52 A.L.R.3d 797, 811 (The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, BancroftWhitney Company 1973) (emphasis added).7

7

The "slight authority to the contrary" referenced in the above quote includes cases on
payment bonds, rather than mechanics' lien cases, 52 A.L.R.3d at 811, n.34.
Moduform, Inc. v. Harry H. Verkler Contractor, Inc., 681 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. App.
1997), relied upon by McKell, is such a case involving a payment bond. Moduform is
also distinguishable because there was no issue regarding whether a contractor's
abandonment of work constituted final completion within the meaning of the bond
statute. Also, the cases cited by the ALR annotation in support of the general rule
include cases from Arizona, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. 52 A.L.R.3d at 811812, n.35.
-11-

Carson also noted that there were two schools of thought as to what
constitutes abandonment, one holding that mere cessation of work constitutes
abandonment, and the other also requiring an intent to abandon:
. . . Two schools of thought prevail as to when
abandonment occurs. One view ... regards abandonment
as a physical condition, not a mental act ...[and] ...
actual cessation of the work, apart from any mental
operations of the owner, constitutes and marks the time
of abandonment where the work is not, in fact, resumed.
Other courts apply [a rule which] declares that in order
to constitute such abandonment ...there should be a
cessation of operation, and an intent on the part of the
owner and contractor to cease operations permanently, or
at least for an indefinite period, or some fair notice to or
knowledge of the abandonment by a lien claimant, either
actual or implied.
1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 74, *6-*7, quoting 52 ALR 3d at 804.
In Carson, the court held that the lien claimant's statement of claim was
untimely under either theory, pursuant to a statute that required the claim to be filed no
earlier than '90 days from the completion of such structure contracted for by him,,8 and
no later than 30 days after the expiration of the 90 day period. 1994 Del. Super.
LEXIS 74, *3. As will be argued below, McKell's action is also untimely under either
theory.

8

There is no analytical difference between statutes that measure the timeliness of a
mechanic's lien claim from the completion of a building, structure or improvement, as
in some states, or from the completion of the contract for such building, structure or
improvement, as in Utah.
-12-

Another case following the general rule is Harper v. Galliher & Huguely,
Inc., 29 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1928), cert, den., 278 U.S. 657 (1929), in which the
mechanic's lien statute required the lien to be filed no later than three months after
completion of the structure. Id. at 453, citing § 1239, D.C. Code. The general
contractor abandoned the project before the structure was completed. Some of the
subcontractors filed their liens more than three months after the general contractor
abandoned the project, and the court held that the lien claims of these subcontractors
were time barred: "... [T]he abandonment of the work by the original contractor is
deemed in law to be a completion of it for the purpose of filing mechanics' liens by
subcontractors and materialmen, and in such case the three months period begins to run
at that date." Id. at 453.
McKell argues that the term "final completion" in the Utah statute should be
given a literal, dictionary definition.9 In responding to a similar argument, the court in
Bethlehem Construction Co. v. Christiana Construction Co., 144 A. 830, 832 (Del.
Super. 1928), responded as follows:
It is insisted that the word "completion" in the statute
must be given its ordinary and generally accepted
meaning, and that, therefore, the statement of claim
could not be filed until the structure was actually
completed, no matter how long, or by whom, it was
finished after the plaintiff discontinued work thereon.

9

Even if the Court were to accept McKell's argument, nothing could be more "finally
complete" than abandonment, which is defined as: "to give up completely." Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary (G.&C. Merriam Co., 1977) (emphasis added).
-13-

But a strict construction does not mean an unreasonable
or unwarranted construction. It cannot mean that the
contractor can stop work for over 5 years, and after the
property has been sold and completed by other persons,
file his statement of claim.
(emphasis added) See also, Projects Unlimited, supra, 798 P.2d at 752: '...[statutory]
interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd.' (emphasis added)
Here, McKell's interpretation of "final completion" is "nonsensical or
absurd." Under that interpretation the 12 month period under § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) will
never begin to run, because McKell will never complete the work for which it
originally contracted. McKeirs counsel admitted as much at oral argument in the
district court, by contending that as of that time (June 26, 2002, over 18 months after
McKell ceased work), final completion still had not occurred (Tr. 20-21, Aple.
Add. A). According to McKeirs interpretation, final completion still has not occurred
as of the date of the filing of this brief (over two and one half years after McKell
ceased work).
McKeirs interpretation defeats the purpose of § 38-1-11, which, under AAA
Fencing, supra, is not merely a statute of limitations, but a statute of repose designed to
"...strictly [limit] the time during which property is encumbered..." 714 P.2d at 289.
Rather than strictly limiting the time during which property is encumbered, McKell's
interpretation makes that time period limitless.

-14-

In accordance with AAA Fencing, the district court here explained its ruling
as follows:
I think the plaintiff's theory countermands
everything I understand the mechanics lien statutes to do.
The goal of the mechanics lien statutes, statute [sic] and
its subparts is to bring these matters to a head so that
property owners, residential or not, can get liens taken
care of if they are filed against them. . .
(Tr. 42, Aple. Add. A, emphasis added) Thus, the district court's interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a), equating cessation and abandonment of work with
"final completion" of the contract under the statute, should be affirmed.
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED,
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, THAT
McKELL DID NOT FILE THIS ACTION TO
ENFORCE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN 12
MONTHS AFTER McKELL CEASED AND
ABANDONED THE WORK TO BE PERFORMED
UNDER THE CONTRACT

McKell erroneously contends that the district court did not find that McKell
ceased or abandoned work. To the contrary, in Conclusion of Law No. 18 (R.85), the
court found that McKell ceased work on October 5, 2000:10
18. McKell last furnished work on the Real
Property on October 5, 2000. The twelve (12) month
period during which McKell was required to file an
action to enforce its lien began to run on October 6, 2000
and ended on October 5, 2001.

To the extent Conclusion of Law No. 18 is a mislabeled finding of fact, this
mislabeling is irrelevant. See, Zions First National Bank, NA. v. National American
Title Ins, Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988).
-15-

Alternatively, the district court found that McKell abandoned the work no
later than November 2, 2000, once it became clear to McKell that Carter would not or
could not pay for the work McKell had already completed, and McKell recorded its
notice of lien (Erickson Aff., f 10, R. 97, Aplt. Add. h):
So I think based on the statute as written, although I
think it's a little vague, and on the earlier case law I
think it's very clear that 12 months from the date of
completion of the original contract in this matter under
these facts has to relate back to the filing of the
mechanics lien which was when the plaintiff decided it
was not going to get paid.
And the plaintiff's affidavit states in the one
paragraph:
"Plaintiff negotiated with Carter in an
attempt to receive payment for work
performed prior to October 5th, 2000. When
Carter would not or could not pay for the
portion of work completed, McKell recorded a
mechanics lien".
At that point they gave up and did no more work,
they called it good.
* # *

And I think the date that we have to look at, I
mean, either way they lose, we either look at October 5th
or we look at November 2nd when the lien was filed.
And either way their action was filed more than a year
later on the 21st of November, 2000.

-16-

(Tr. 43-44, Aple. Add. A, emphasis added)11
McKell also argues that the issue of whether it abandoned the project is a
factual issue, citing Ketchum, supra, 784 P.2d at 1225. However, McKell may not
raise this issue on appeal, because it never raised the issue in the district court
(R. 58-66; Tr. generally). See, Hart, supra. Instead, at oral argument in the district
court, McKell argued only that the issue of whether final completion had occurred,
according to its interpretation of this phrase (i. e., completion of all work originally
called for by the contract) was a factual issue (Tr. 28, Aple. Add. A).
Even if McKell had preserved for appeal its argument that abandonment
presents a factual issue, the facts of Ketchum are distinguishable. For example,
Ketchum noted: "In the case before us, the record is not clear when work ceased on the
project." 784 P.2d at 1226. Here, the evidence in the record is undisputed that work
ceased on October 5, 2000 (Erickson Aft, 1 6, R. 98, Aplt. Add. h).
In Ketchum, the work stopped and then resumed (784 P.2d at 1219, 1226),
and the court held: ". . .[T]he fact that a building project may be temporarily halted
does not necessarily mean that an abandonment has occurred." (Id. at 1225, emphasis
added) Here, it is undisputed that McKell never resumed work on the project after
October 5, 2000 (Erickson Aff., 1 11, R. 97, Aplt. Add. A).

n

The court misspoke as to the filing date of this action, which was November 21,
2001.
-17-

Also, even if intent to abandon is required, that intent has also been
established here, based upon the undisputed facts. Paragraph 12 of the Erickson Aff.
claimed that McKell intended to complete the project upon payment for past work and
assurance of payment for future work (R. 97, Aplt. Add h).
However, Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. concedes that the reason McKell
recorded its notice of lien on November 2, 2000, was because it had negotiated with
Carter concerning payment for McKell's past work, those negotiations had failed, and
McKell knew, as of November 2, 2000, that "Carter would not or could not pay for the
portion of work completed," let alone pay for any future work. (R. 97, Aplt. Add. h)
Thus, the Erickson Aff. does not contend that McKell's negotiations with Carter
continued after November 2, 2000, and abandonment occurred no later than that date,
as the district court alternatively ruled.
Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish that McKell ceased work on
October 5, 2000, abandoned the project no later than November 2, 2000, and that this
action filed on November 21, 2001 was therefore time barred by the 12-month statute
ofrepose in § 38-1-1 l(l)(a).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the district court's Amended Order should be
affirmed. Also, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), Wells Fargo should be
awarded its attorney fees and costs as the successful party on this appeal, in amounts to
be determined by the district court on remand.
-18-
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ADDENDUM A

1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4 R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING,
Plaintiff,

5
6

ORAL ARGUMENT

VS.

7 CARTER CONSTRUCTION, et al,

Case
Appeal

010405004
2002716-SC

8
Defendant.

Judge Claudia Laycock

9

CO
O

^
CO

10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on June 26, 2002.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17
18

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

19
(From Electronic Recording)
20
21
22

ORIGINAL

23
24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 102811-7801
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423-2663

1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(June 26, 2002)

3

THE JUDGE:

4

Okay.

Thank you.

Please be seated.

We are here in the matter of McKell

5

Excavating versus Carter Construction, etcetera.

6

actually here on I think the bank's motion.

7

MR. CALL:

8

THE JUDGE:

9

your appearance for the record.
MR. REED:

10
11

MR. CALL:

Now let's have counsel state your,

I'm Jack Reed representing the

Randall Call appearing on behalf of

Wells Fargo, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

14
15

That's correct, Your Honor.

plaintiff McKell Excavating.

12
13

But we're

All right.

Now, this is actually

the bank's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.

16

All right.

Gentlemen, why don't you go ahead.

18

MR. CALL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

19

THE JUDGE:

Let me just make sure I understand the

17

Mr. Call?

20

end goal here.

If I were to grant your motion it would in

21

effect dismiss the first claim for relief as to all parties

22

because that claim is only going for the valid lien, it seeks

23

to have the lien established and adjudge this valid.

24

then by doing that in effect it would take the bank out

25

entirely because you would have nothing else at risk.
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And

1

MR. CALL:

Correct, Your Honor.

2

THE JUDGE:

Okay.
ARGUMENT BY MR. CALL

3
MR. CALL:

4

Our, our motion is based upon the

5

pleadings.

6

filed by a, the plaintiff in this case, a counteraffidavit,

7

but so I think the Court can consider that affidavit and, and

8

do this as a motion for summary judgment.

9

the affidavit that has been filed it doesn't change a, the

10

And I recognize that there's been an affidavit

I think even with

basic facts.

11

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

12

MR. CALL:

And I don't believe there are any

13

disputed facts.

14

we've set forth in the memorandum.

15

repeat what's in the memorandum b u t —

16

And the facts are, are fairly simple as

THE JUDGE:

And I'm not going to

Well what, what I would like you

17

to do as a beginning, why don't, why don't I just have you

18

list what you view as the undisputed facts and let's see if

19

there is an agreement between the parties as to what the

20

facts are.

21

MR. CALL:

Sure.

Your Honor, I think the

22

undisputed facts are that a, the plaintiff, R.A. McKell

23

Excavating, Inc. commenced, entered into a contract with

24

Carter Construction or Carter Development in order to perform

25

some services on real property located in Utah County, I
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1

is their right.

2

industry.

3

unusual in the construction industry for payment to be slow.

4

It's not unusual for a contractor to negotiate with an owner

5

and try and get those payments current and, and for work to

6

slow down and in some cases stop.

7

synonymous with final completion as we, as is commonly

8

understood.

9

And that's not unusual in the construction

They have problems with payment.

It's not

But that is not

The lien does not state that final completion

10

occurred on October 5, 2000.

11

work was October 5, 2000.

12

what the statute requires.

13

have a, and valid mechanics lien you have to include certain

14

things in the notice and two of those things are the first

15

day of work and the last day of work, last day of work.

16

it doesn't say final completion date.

17

lien say that final completion was October 5, 2000.

18
19
20

The lien says the last day of

And it says that because that's
38-1-7 says that in order to

But

And nowhere does the

The complaint does not say that final completion
occurred on October 5, 2000.
So nowhere in the pleadings and nowhere in the lien

21

has McKell stated and has the bank admitted that final

22

completion occurred on October 5, 2000 because it simply

23

didn't happen.

24

THE JUDGE:

So when did it occur?

25

MR. REED:

It hasn't occurred.
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1

occurred.

THE JUDGE:

2
3

And let me address that issue.
Yes.

Because it seems to me your,

your theory is this thing could float out there for years.

4

MR. REED:

Well—

5

THE JUDGE:

There would be no statute of

6

limitations.
MR. REED:

7

It could, it could certainly float for

8

an extended period of time.

But this is what the, an owner

9

can do if they want to, if they want to fix that.

If you

10

get to a point where, as in this situation, where work up to

11

a certain point is completed but there is still work to be

12

done and you don't have the money to pay for that, what an

13

owner does is writes a deductive change order and deducts

14

that work out of the contract and then sends a letter off to

15

the contractor saying we are taking this work out of your

16

contract, we're deducting this amount from the contract

17

amount, we don't owe it to you anymore, you're done.

18

that didn't happen here.

19

before the Court to indicate that that happened here.

20

And

At least there's no evidence

The evidence is to the contrary.

The evidence is

21

that the McKell tried to work with the owner to insure that

22

the project could go forward and that McKell would get paid,

23

and the owner was unable to meet the conditions satisfying

24

payment.

25

So while it's theoretically possible that this date
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1

specified in the statute, and which the legislature didn't

2

set forth.

3

final completion of the original contract.

4

submit that that's what the statute means.

5

a substantial completion.

The legislature started the clock running on
And we, we
It does not mean

6

In conclusion we think the bank's motion should be

7

denied because the bank is not clearly entitled to judgment.

8

And there are, the material fact about what happened on

9

October 5 was the, was the project, was the project finally

10

completed at that time or not?

11

yes, but was the contract finally completed on October 5, was

12

McKell's contract with Carter Development finally completed

13

on October 5 is a question of fact.

14

Court adopts the, the standard articulated by the Utah courts

15

that inference needs to be construed in the favor of McKell

16

that the contract was not finally completed on October 5,

17

therefore, the mechanics lien is timely, or at least there is

18

a question of fact and, therefore, the bank's motion should

19

be denied.

20

THE JUDGE:

That's the last day of work,

The inference is if the

Why, why should McKell's filing of the

21

mechanics, mechanics lien less than a month later on November

22

2nd, 2000 not be construed by the Court as they're calling it

23

quits and the contract, whatever they were going to do on

24

that contract was now complete?

25

MR. REED:

Because there, there is a variety of
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1

I'm not as sure as Mr. Call that the definition of

2

residence doesn't apply.

3

by either party so I'll give that one up.

4

easy way out for me, frankly.

5

don't think they were residences yet I won't go that way.

6

But that doesn't seem to be argued
It would be the

But a, since the parties

The issue is whether or not we have a date of final

7

completion of the original contract.

It is clear to me that

8

as contemplated originally by the parties the contract was

9

not completed.

However, I am persuaded by Mr. Call's

10

arguments as to the interpretation of final completion

11

requiring some finality to it.

12

I think the plaintiff's theory countermands

13

everything I understand the mechanics lien statutes to do.

14

The goal of the mechanics lien statutes, statute and its

15

subparts is to bring these matters to a head so that property

16

owners, residential or not, can get liens taken care of if

17

they are filed against them, and so that the lien claimants

18

don't have to wait forever.

19

by the plaintiff would mean that number one, the lien

20

claimant would always have a subjective, subjective power to

21

call the contract complete, and number two, by Mr. Call's

22

theory would preclude the lien claimant from ever filing a,

23

the action if the original contract was never completed.

24

would force the lien claimant into going ahead somehow and

25

completing the contract just in order to file his action.
MCKELL VS. CARTER

And I think the theory espoused

JUNE 26, 2002

It

And to me that makes absolutely no sense.
I see nothing i.i i.ne S I J JL-.

::^I, p:-.,viUT_

what M* . Reed has suggested that : r^ ou!-"r to bring things lo

change the contract

;• 's 'iot : r, the statute,

/.rx

•w o i I t: : • ;,< i a i I t t : d c 11 I a t e , i i i a

11 1 e • o w n e r i: e a ] 1 y 1 I a s

case like this where the owner is apparently not doing well
financially.
So I think based on the statute as written,
d_LLrK .

'hi'-]- _Lt!s a iitt.1 e vague; and on the earl i er case

lav/ 1 Mi: ik ^ L ^ very clear that 12 months from the date of
completion of i h••• oricliMl. contract in this matter under
. ' ^ > . • c '. L ::

• :

b a c k t: • : 11 I e • f :i ] i i I g : f 11: I e i n e c I: I a i i i c

L i e n v.r; ::•!-: \-:.<.y -;.:--n i:io pi aintiff decided it was not going to

And l.hf-; plaintiff's affidavit states in the one
p.jrac;: uph :
"Plaintiff negotiated with Carter in an
atfemnf I • receive payment for work
periormed prio: n. 0cLoo^r >; t • , 2000.
When Carter would no* or could not pay
for to:---

J}I;LU-.,.

on [ ;.L

-O

- r el ]

recorded n mechanics ;i- *".
• ai id :i:i d i i, :> n tor e v, • : i: k,
they called it good.
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1

And so I thi nk as far as this plaintiff w a s

2

concerned t h a t c o i 111: a c t f o i 11 i e i i: :i i t • E I t s a i i d p i I i: p o s e s w a s

3

completed on October 5th and they went ahead and filed their

4

niechani cs ] :i ei i.

5
6

This action before me is an action to perfect
) i e i :i

'

-

. - - ' • : •

\ha\

j

statute:
!

M jLXeii c l a i m a n t .shall

e n f o r c e t h e l i e n t u u . J u.^x,;

9

I0

ohapt^

1 f

i:i^L -

1 2 very l i e n

: riat was f i l e d .

, re ..'

13
14

" 1 1 ^ an a c t i o n

LL.

to

nis

pi . i, •

Tl i a t i s ti le

T h e r e w - r e r; , ^ t h e :

liens

-: • •

J ool ;: at,

-

,

filed.
I

mean, either way they lose, we either look a: October 5th or

1 5 we ] ool : a

!

•

,

* *

.-q.

And ei ther

i 6 way their action w a s liied more than a year rater o n the 21st
I ; of November, 2000.
18

It's a vague statute.

1 9 written.
20
2 1

Subparagraph

It could be better

(b) I think is much better written,

much m o r e clear b e c a u s e it states s p e c i t i e a l l y ;
"from the date the lien clain lant

22

1 a s t p e r f o r m e d .1 a b o r a i I d s e i: v :i c e s , o r

23

last furnished equipment or m a t e r i a L "

2 1:
25

I (* -n T *'-a;
helps me define the ambiguities in subparagraph ( a ) , < :
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Carson Construction A

l %t

••

••<

Civil Action

-

%ini: *V A s s o c i a t e s , P . C .
i

SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAW ARK. SUSSEX
1

•

•*

February

COUNSEL:
1*1]
Robert G. Gibbs. Esquire. Wilson, Halbrook &
Bayard. P.O Box 272. Georgetown. ' V

loo^

••"•w„«. ** . . arncii LL Inquire ilriuti D. Shirey,
.squire, Tunneli & Taysor, P.O. Box 151. Georgetown,
«)ei iOlM7
J UDGES:
GRAVES
i ?MONBY:
T.HFNI.EY GRAVES

dismiss piaintiii s iv c -J tumplaint and >.... .-.Miff«- *:i
personam action. This Court has accepted plaintiffs weilpleaded allegations as true, and for the reasons set forth
below, defendant's motion is granted pursuant to Superior
Court Civil Rule i 2(b)(6). n!
nl Defenes not set for th a statutory
basis for the .
n. The Court recognizes
Superior Court Civil R . 12(b)(6) as the
appropriate legal vehicle W: ine purposes of this
proceeding

Associates, P.C. ("Mott" or "defendant"), Randy Mott is
the sole shareholder [*2] of Mott & Associates. In early
1992, Mott and his wife, Debi Mott, contracted with
Carson Construction & Design, Inc. ("Carson" or
"plaintiff) to renovate and remodel the beach property.
Debi Mott was to work on the home as an interior designer,
and Carson was to work as the general contractor for
construction. Carson commenced work on February 17,
1992. By the spring of that year, the relationship between
Randy Mott, Debi Mott and Carson had deteriorated due to
Randy Mott's belief that he was being overtoiled,
defrauded and cuckolded by Debi Mott and Carson. Mott
& Associates had remitted payments totaling $ 65,000 to
Carson. However, Randy Mott refused to pay additional
amounts demanded after June of 1992. The last date of
delivery of materials and furnishing of labor by Carson
occurred on June 17, 1992. Carson stopped working after
June 1.7, 1992 because of nonpayment. The renovations to
the beach property were never completed.
On September 4, 1992, Randy Mott filed a civil action
for fraud and conversion against Debi Mott and Carson in
the Superior Court; of the District of Columbia.
Approximately one week later, Randy Mott had the locks
to the beach property changed. On October [*3] 15,1992,,
Carson's counsel received from Randy Mott
communication definitively precluding further work by
Carson. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that constructive
completion occurred upon receipt of this communication.
On November 13,1992, Carson filed the within complaint
and statement of claim for a mechanics' lien on amounts
past due.
DISCUSSION

FACTS
' I he subject of this proceeding is residential beach
property located at 113 Oakwood Avenue, Bethany Beach,
Delaware. The property is titled in the name of a
Washington, D.C. corporation known as Mott &

Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff s complaint on
the basis that plaintiffs complaint and statement of claim
were not filed timely. The Delaware mechanics' lien
statute, 25 Del.C § 2711(a) provides;
"- contractor who (1) has made his contract directly with

Pas;c 2
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the owner or reputed owner of any structure and (2) has
furnished both labor and material in and for such structure
shall file no statement of claim until after the expiration of
90 days from the completion of such structure contracted
for by him; but such contractor, in order to avail himself of
the benefits of this subchapter, shall file his statement ol
claim within 10 davs after the expiration of the 90 LLU
period

Co v Christiana Construction Co, supra is cited for this
proposition by Maurice T. Brunner, LL.B. in Abandonment
of Construction or of Contract as Affecting Time for Filing
Mechanics' Liens or Time for Giving Notice to ()wuer, 52
4 L R 3d T (JQ73) Mr. Brunner states:
ihere is bioad dtillnnih tor a general rule that
abandonment is the equ i tilt nt of completion for purposes
of the mechanics' lien statutes; and under statutes which
require the notice, claim or statement of mechanics' lien to
be filed within a certain time after completion of the
building or improvement, it is, apart from slight authority
1 *6] to the contrary, very generally held or recognized that
where the building or improvement is not completed but
work is abandoned thereon, abandonment of the work is
equivalent to completion for the purposes of the statute,
and that the filing both may and, in order to be timely,
must be made within the statutory period after such
abandonment.

I he hd.iwttte mechanics' lien statute is silent as to
noncompletion. The courts, however, have adapted to such
circumstances by applying the concept [*4]
of
"constructive completion." For instance, when the
performance of the contract is on a certain date rendered
impossible through no fault of the contractor, or where
there is permanent abandonment of the work, there is then
constructive completion, and the contractor must file his
tatement of claim within 30 days after the expiration of 90
days from that date. Bethlehem Construction Co. v
Christiana Construction Co., Del. Super., 34 Del. 147, 144
A. 830 (1928).

Defining abandonment m«i\ prove problematic
Brunner explains:

Plaintiff argues that the mechanics' lien statute cannot
be strictly construed because it does not provide guidance
for filing in cases where there is no certain date of
constructive completion. Plaintiff offers no definitive "date
certain" for constructive completion. Rather, plaintiff
recognizes three date^ of significance

Mt

Abandonment of work will not be presumed where the
right to a mechanics' lien ts in question, but must be
established by the evidence ... the courts are not in accord
as to what constitutes abandonment. Two schools of
thought prevail as to when abandonment occur > One \ lew
... regards abandonment as a physical condition, not a
mental act... [and] ... actual cessation of the work, apart
If oni am mental operations of the owner, constitutes and
marks the time of abandonment where the work is not, in
fact, resumed. Other courts apply [a rule which] declares
that in order to constitute such abandonment ... there
should be a cessation of operation, and an intent on the part
of the owner and contractor to cease operations
permanently, or at least for an indefinite period, [*7] or
some fair notice to or knowledge of the abandonment by a
lien claimant, either actual or implied.

1 i lulv 1992: defendant stops payment
2.) September 7-10, 1992: defendant changes tin kit L un
the home thus precluding entry by plaintiff
3.) October 15, 1992: plaintiffs attorney is notified that
plaintiff is no longer authorized to work on the beach home
Plaintiff suggests that the November U, 1992 complaint
was timely filed [*5] 30 days after the October 15, 1992
notice from defendant, plaintiff maintains that once notice
was given, there was no reason to wait for the 90 day
statutory period since the last date of performance was
June 17, 1992, and the time for subcontractor filing had
lapsed See 25 Del C § 2111(h).

Delaware is silent as to its definition oi abandonment.
However, plaintiffs claim fails under either view. 25
Del.C § 2711(a) establishes a thirty day window in which
a mechanics' lien must be filed. Under the first view,
abandonment would have occurred on June 17,1992, when
plaintiff actually and physically stopped work on the beach
property. The November 13, 1992 filing would then have
been approximately one month late. Under the second
view, abandonment could have occurred either during the

I. Constructive Completion Occurs at Abandonment.
In the case at bar, completion can be said to have
occurred when Carson abandoned work on the beach
property The Delaware case ol Ik if lit hem Construction
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week in September when Randy Mott changed the locks on
the beach property, thereby evidencing his intent to
permanently preclude further work by Carson, or on
October 15, 1992, when Randy Mott informed Carson's
counsel that Carson no longer had authority to work on the
beach property In either case, the November 13, 1002
filing by plaintiff would have been too early.

that every essential statutory step in the creation of the lien
has been duly taken. E. J. Hollingsworth Co. v.
Continental-DiamondF. Co., Del. Super., 36Del 303, 175
A. 266 (1934). The statutory provisions are mandatory, and
the inability to comply with the statute means that a lien
cannot be obtained because "the Court has no power to
create exceptions where none exist." Warner Co. v.
Lecdom Construction Co., Del. Super, 4^ Del 4^, 93
i 2d 316, 319(1952).

11. fhe Necessity of Strict Statutory Construction.
Delaware law is rich with the mandate that the
mechanics' 1 ien statute be strictly construed. Department of
Community Affairs and Economic Development v M
Davis & Sons, Inc., Del. Supr., 412A.2d939 (1980); 1*81
Gould, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., Del. Super., 435 A.2d 730
(1981); Silverside Home Mart, Inc. v. Hall, Del. Super,
345A.2d427 (1975); lannottiv. Kalmbacher, Del. Super
34 Del. 600, 156 A. 366 (1935); Bethlehem Construction
Co. v. Christiana Construction Co., Del. Super., 34 Del
147, 144 4 830 (1928), In re Long, Del. Super, 27 Del
88, 86 A 104 (1913i

CONCLUSION
Given the above, this Court finds that plaintiff failed
lo establish a date of completion which would meet the
statutory requirements for filing mechanics' a lini
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's in
rem complaint is GRANTED, With regard to plaintiffs in
personam claim, this Court has the inherent power to stay
proceedings in control of its docket after balancing
competing interests. Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Steigler,
Pel Super, 300 A 2d 16 (1972), affd, 306 A.2d 742
(1973) Since this Court [*10] has disposed of plaintiffs
in rem complaint, it would be inefficient and duplicative to
hear plaintiffs in personam claim. The District of
< nlnmbia action was commenced two months prior to the
piesent action and has now progressed to the arbitration
stage. The parties reside and conduct business in or near
the Washington, D.C. area, and the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia has properly acquired jurisdiction
UH J the disputed renovations. Defendant's motion to stay
plaintiffs in personam claim pending resolution of the
District of Columbia suit is therefore GRANTED.

1 he necessity for compliance w iilislalutoiy piovisioiio
is addressed in S3 Am. Jur. id. Mechanics' Liens § 168
(1970):
Mechanics' liens are purely statutory, have no existence
without the statute that controls their perfecting and
\ nlurcing, and are obtainable only by those who can meet
the statutory requisites. They can be acquired only in the
manner and on the conditions prescribed in the statute, and
the essential elements of a statute prescribing the
conditions upon which the remedy may be obtained are
mandatory and not merely directory

IT IS SO ORDERED.
T Ilenle\ Groves

Moreover, it is settled in Delaware that the validity of a
mechanics' lien depends f*9] upon an affirmative showing
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20030534-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is a consolidated appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw guilty pleas
in two cases against the same defendant, which pleas were entered to two counts of
burglary, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002)
(statute attached in Addendum A).1 This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

!

The appellate record in this matter includes the individual record for each of the
two consolidated appeals: district court case numbers 021911211 and 021911684.
Because the records are largely duplicative of each other, the State cites primarily to the
record in case number 021911211 by page and volume number (not case number).
Citation to the record in case no. 021911684 is included only where necessary and begins
with the last four digits of the case number, i.e., (R. 1684/pleading page) or (R.
1684/volume:page).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the trial court properly denied as
untimely defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after the judge had informed
defendant that he must file any such motion before sentencing, and defendant filed his
motion three days after sentencing.
This issue presents a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. See
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, <[} 6, 5 P.3d 1222, overruled on other grounds,
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following statutory and rule provisions are relevant to the issue raised on
appeal and are attached in Addendum C:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2003);
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant in two cases with a total of eleven second-degree
felony burglaries, two third-degree felony attempted burglaries, five second-degree felony
thefts, one third-degree felony theft, four class A misdemeanor thefts, and one class A
misdemeanor cruelty to animals, all of which arose from a series of incidents occurring
between August 21 and September 23, 2002 (R. 1-11; R. 1684/2-3). Fingerprints found at
the scene of two of the crimes matched defendant's (R. 10; R. 1684/3). The trial court
2

appointed counsel, and, following a preliminary hearing, bound defendant over on all
charges (R. docket at 2-5; R. 36-38; R. 1684/11-13). At a hearing on April 21, 2003, after
three trial dates had been continued, defendant waived the jury (R. docket at 5-9; R. 42,
63-66, 80-85, 90-91; R. 1684/docket at 4-8; R. 1684/17-18,35-37,42). The court set
back-to-back bench trials for May 8, 2003 (R. docket at 9; R. 90; R. 1684/docket at 8; R.
1684/81:4).
The parties and the witnesses appeared on the morning of trial (R. 127:7).
However, defendant decided that morning to enter guilty pleas in both cases (R. 126:4).
Defense counsel explained that defendant would plead guilty to a single charge of
second-degree burglary in each case for the charges allegedly involving his fingerprints
(R. 127:1) (the transcript of the plea colloquy is attached as Addendum D). In return,
the prosecution would seek to dismiss the remaining charges and would recommend
concurrent sentencing on both offenses (R. 92-99; R. 127:5). Add. D. The trial court
engaged in a detailed colloquy with defendant, insuring that he understood the rights he
had and was giving up by entering his pleas, that he was not under the influence of
anything or anyone, that he had been given ample time to discuss the plea details with his
counsel and was satisfied with his counsel's representation, and that counsel had
answered all of his questions (R. 92-99; R. 127:2-5). Add. D. Defense counsel produced
an unsigned affidavit in support of the plea, and the court reviewed the factual basis for
each plea (R. 92-99; R. 127:3, 5). Add. D. Defense counsel assured the trial judge that

3

he had discussed the affidavit with defendant, he believed that defendant understood its
contents, and the affidavit contained true and accurate declarations made by the defendant
(R. 97; R. 127:1-2). Add. D. The trial judge completed the colloquy, incorporated the
plea affidavit, accepted defendant's guilty pleas, then invited defendant to sign the plea
affidavit:
THE COURT: And you can sign that if you haven't done that
already. We'll have you execute that now and that will be further evidence
that you understand your rights and the charges and the consequences or
penalties to you. You have up until the time of sentencing to move to
withdraw the plea for good cause.
And I'm assuming we need [a] pre-sentence report if for nothing
more than restitution amounts.
(R. 127:5). Add. D.
Defense counsel responded by requesting that defendant be sentenced on both
cases on May 12-four days away. Defense counsel explained his reasoning:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, in this particular matter, Mr.
Quintana went to jury trial in another burglary under Judge Reese,
approximately a month ago[,] and his sentencing is set for Monday in front
of Judge Reese. [A p]re-sentence report has already been prepared. I am
asking you to send these two cases to Judge Reese for sentencing. Mr.
Quintana agrees and will stipulate to the restitution on these matters[,] and I
don't think that there's anything necessary needful [sic] to get on these
particular matters[,] and Mr. Quintana would like to get going. So what
we're asking the Court to do is send these two to Judge Reese for
sentencing[,] although the other is set for Monday next.

4

(R. 127:6).2 Add. D. The trial judge granted the request, but set sentencing in this case
for June 2 in case Judge Reese declined to take both matters (R. 127:6-7). Add. D.
On May 12, defendant appeared for sentencing before Judge Reese on all three
matters (R. 126) (a copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in Addendum E). The
prosecutor made the promised recommendation, gave some background on the plea
bargain, and highlighted several points in the presentence investigation report: defendant
admitted to filing the palms of his hands along with the fingers, he "appears to lack even
those basic abilities needed to function on a daily basis outside of prison[,]" he is a danger
to himself and the community with his heroin addiction, he escaped a juvenile detention
center by use of a firearm, he has a "very, very lengthy history of adult crime[,]" he failed
to successfully complete any of the eight paroles he had been granted, and he was picked
up on nineteen felonies in the four years and seven months he spent outside of prison
during his adult life (R. 126: 5-6). Add. E.
Judge Reese ultimately sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of
one-to-fifteen years for each of the three second-degree felony burglary convictions, with
the sentences to run consecutively to each other (R. 102-03; R. 126:9-10).
Three days later—on May 15, 2003—defendant filed a motion with Judge
McCleve, seeking wlo withdraw his guilty pleas[,]" but giving no basis or explanation for

2

The matter before Judge Reese was another second-degree felony burglary (R.
102-03; R. 126:9-10).
5

the motion, and including no memorandum of points and authorities (R. 104-05).3 The
State responded the next day, noting that, under the statute in effect at the time the pleas
were entered, defendant's motion was untimely, robbing the court of jurisdiction to
entertain it (R. 107-09), Defendant filed no response to the State's argument and, on May
27. the Judge McCleve entered an order denying defendant's motion as untimely (R. 110)
(attached in Addendum F). Defendant timely appealed from that denial (R. 112-13).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4
Between August 21 and September 23, 2002, burglaries and thefts occurred or
were attempted at twelve different residential locations (R. 1-11; R. 1684/2-3). Most of
the entries had been accomplished by use of vice grips, channel-locks, or pliers on
doorknobs during the daytime while the occupants were not home (R. 7-11; R. 1684/5).
Fingerprints retrieved from two locations matched defendant's (R. 10; R. 1684/3). On
September 20, the State charged defendant with ten counts of burglary, two counts of
attempted burglary, nine counts of theft, and one count of cruelty to animals for the
torture death of a cat at one of the burglary sites (R. 22-32). All offenses giving rise to
these charges occurred between August 21 and September 13, and defendant's
fingerprints were found at one location (id.). On October 9, the State charged defendant
3

No motion to withdraw appears in the pleading file for case number 021911684,
but the one filed in case number 021911211 has both case numbers on it (R. 104-05).
4

The facts are taken from the affidavit of defendant submitted in support of his
guilty pleas, statements made during the plea colloquy and the sentencing hearing, and the
information and probable cause statements filed in each case.
6

with one count each of burglary and theft for an offense which occurred on September 23
and at which his fingerprints were found (R. 1684:2-3).
In the course of sentencing, defendant explained that his conduct was the result of
his need to finance his long-term heroin habit (R. 126:7-8).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The statutory deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea changed three
days before entry of defendant's pleas. The plea affidavit referred to the old deadline.
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the trial judge did not adequately inform
him of the time limit for filing a motion to withdraw his pleas because: 1) the untimely
motion robs this Court of jurisdiction to review his claim that the trial court did not
comply with rule 11(e)(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 2) the trial court expressly
informed him at the plea hearing of the proper deadline under the newly-amended statute,
and the filing of an untimely motion thereafter robbed the trial court of jurisdiction to
consider the motion or to extend the time for filing it.
Even assuming that the trial court should have inquired further to ensure that
defendant was not confused by the inaccurate deadline contained in his plea affidavit,
such error would not require reversal where defendant invited it. Both defendant and his
counsel assured the judge that they had reviewed the affidavit and that defendant
understood its contents. Defense counsel also certified that the statements in the affidavit
were true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. Neither defendant nor his counsel
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voiced any confusion or concern about the deadline, giving the trial judge no reason to
inquire further. Consequently, any error in the trial court's failure to clarify the time limit
in the affidavit does not warrant reversal.
Finally, defendant's claim fails on appeal because rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, does not mandate that the trial court extend the time to file the withdrawal
motion when a defendant is not properly informed of the deadline. The permissive
language of the rule permits the trial court some discretion in extending the filing
deadline. Any error on the trial court's part in this case in not elaborating on the fling
deadline should not be grounds for extending the deadline where defendant was told the
correct information in open court, and any mistake as to the deadline is attributable to
himself or to his counsel.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE INFORMED DEFENDANT OF THE
APPROPRIATE DEADLINE FOR FILING A MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS, THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY MOTION FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT INVITED ANY
ERROR
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied as untimely his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas and that he is entitled to a remand to have a hearing on his
motion. Br. of Aplt. at 8-15. He claims that the statute providing the deadline for filing
such a motion changed "during plea negotiations," that he was "not informed" of the
appropriate deadline so long as the misstatement in the affidavit remained unaddressed,

and that he is entitled to additional time to file the motion under rule 11(f), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 8-10. However, where defendant filed an untimely motion to
withdraw, where he was informed by the trial judge of the proper deadline, or,
alternatively, where he invited any error below, he cannot succeed on his appellate claim.
A.

Statutory Background
Prior to May 5, 2003, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) provided that "A request to

withdraw a plea of guilty . .. shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). A guilty plea was entered upon sentencing. See
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 11, 31 P.3d 528. Consequently, a defendant had thirty days
after sentencing to file a motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f3,
40 P.3d 630 (failure to file a motion to withdraw within thirty days of entry of the plea
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal.").
This is the deadline that is contained in the plea affidavit (R. 97) (a copy of the affidavit is
attached in Addendum G).
On May 5, the 2003 amendment to the statute became effective and provided:
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion before
sentence is announced.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2)(b) (2003) (attached in Addendum C). This is the deadline
announced by the trial judge in open court during the plea colloquy (R. 127:5).

9

B.

Defendant's Claim Fails Where the Judge Stated the Correct Time Limit:
Alternatively, Defendant Invited Any Error
1. Defendant was informed of the proper deadline, defeating his claim
Under the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 3-4,

where a defendant does not timely move to withdraw his guilty pleas within the time
advised by the trial court, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to address the issue of
whether the lower court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which identifies the information the
trial judge must find before he accepting a plea as voluntarily and knowingly entered,
provides that the judge must ensure that "the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(7). Add. C.
In this case, the trial judge expressly informed defendant during the plea colloquy,
u

You have up until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for good cause"

(R. 127:5). This was an accurate statement of the law in existence at the time the guilty
pleas were entered, and the judge made the statement to defendant in open court (id).
Defendant acknowledges the fact that the trial court expressly informed him of the
deadline at the plea colloquy and that his motion to withdraw his pleas below was three
days late. Br. of Aplt. at 5, 7-11. However, he minimizes these points, stressing instead
the deadline set forth in the plea affidavit and the fact that he filed his motion within that
erroneous period of time. Id.
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Because defendant in fact filed his motion outside the time allowed by statute, this
Court is without jurisdiction to address on appeal defendant's claim that the trial court did
not comply with rule 11(e)(7), and the appeal should be dismissed. See Reyes, 2002 UT
13, ™! 3-4 (failure to file a timely motion to withdraw robs the appellate court of
jurisdiction to review whether the trial court complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure); State v. Brooks, 2003 UT App 84, 2003 WL 21282559 (citing
Reyes. 2002 UT 13, f3) (attached in Addendum B). But see State v. Swensen, 1999 UT
App 340, 1999 WL 33244784 (because defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, this
Court has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw the
plea) (attached in Addendum B). See also Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16,
44 P.3d 734, 739 (unpublished memorandum decisions "may be presented . . . as
persuasive authority . . . so long as all parties and the court are supplied with accurate
copies at the time the decision is first cited").
Moreover, because defendant admits that the trial court in fact complied with rule
11(e)(7) by properly informing him of the deadline for filing his motion to withdraw, this
Court should affirm the denial of his motion. Defendant's untimely motion, filed after the
trial court's express statement of the deadline, robbed the trial court of jurisdiction to
consider defendant's motion or to extend the time for filing it, and defendant's appeal
fails. See State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996) (addressing a motion to
withdraw a plea filed one day after expiration of the statutory deadline, and holding "if a
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defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a[n untimely] motion to withdraw"); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f).
2. If this Court finds defendant was not properly informed about the filing
deadline, relief should be denied because defendant invited any error
Defendant argues that the trial judge should have expressly identified and
corrected the deadline in the affidavit before the amended statute may be applied to him.
Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. He claims that unless the trial judge established that he understood
which deadline applied, he was not properly informed of the deadline and is entitled to a
hearing on his motion. Id. at 8, 15. However, defendant is not entitled to the relief he
seeks.
Even assuming the trial court committed error in failing to clarify the erroneous
statement in the plea affidavit, the error would not warrant reversal because defendant
and his counsel invited it by assuring the court that they knew the contents of the
affidavit, the contents were true and accurate, and they had no questions or concerns
about them. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (explaining the invited
error doctrine). In other words, the court made the requisite inquiry concerning the
written affidavit and defendant's understanding of the court's statements, informed
defendant of the appropriate deadline for filing a motion to withdraw his pleas, and was
led by defendant and his counsel to believe nothing more was required.
Defense counsel represented to the court that he had "gone over the elements of
the offenses," "the factual basis for the plea[s]" and "all of [defendant's] constitutional
12

rights" with defendant (R. 127:1-2). Defendant affirmed that he had talked with his
counsel about his constitutional rights, that he knew he was giving up those rights by
pleading guilty, and that he had read the affidavit, gone through it, and asked counsel all
the questions he had (R. 127:3-5). Further, defense counsel signed the plea affidavit in
open court, certifying the following:
I certify that I am the attorney for Raymond M. Quintana, the
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I
have read it to him/her: / have discussed it with him/her and believe that
he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these
along with the other representations and declarations made by the
defendant in the foregoing affidavit are accurate and true.
(R. 52-58) (emphasis added) (the affidavit is attached as Addendum G).
Moreover, aside from misleading the trial court and doing nothing to correct the
affidavit's deadline—which he now admits is wrong—defense counsel requested that
sentencing occur only four days later, thereby minimizing defendant's ability to file a
timely motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 127:5-6). Having invited the trial court to believe
that no inconsistency existed between the colloquy and the written affidavit, then cut
defendant's time to file a timely withdrawal motion down to four days, defendant is in no
position on appeal to challenge the court's failure to inquire further. Consequently, even
assuming error in the trial court's failure to expressly recognize the erroneous statement
in the affidavit and to correct it on the record, reversal is not warranted as the error was

13

invited by defendant and his counsel. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah
App. 1991) (noting thatfc*[t]hedoctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up
an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.") (internal quotation omitted); but
see State v. Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, «[18, 74 P.3d 1171 (finding no invited error
where the plea affidavit omitted the same two rule 11 rights that the trial court omitted
from the colloquy, and neither defendant nor his counsel mentioned the omissions when
the trial judge specifically asked if there was anything more they wanted the judge to
address regarding the rule 11 rights), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Dec. 2, 2003).
3, Even assuming defendant was not sufficiently informed of the
proper deadline, relief is not automatically warranted as no extension
of the filing time is mandated
Finally, even if this Court determines that defendant was not properly informed of
the appropriate deadline, it should still affirm the trial court's rejection of the withdrawal
motion as untimely. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) provides:
Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but
may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section
77-13-6.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f) (emphasis added). Add. C. The permissive language of the rule
makes it clear that extension of the filing time is not automatic. The rule leaves it to the
trial court to determine whether the extension is warranted. Defendant is not entitled to
an extension in this case because he was told in open court the proper deadline for filing
his motion, he advanced no basis in the trial court to allow the judge to determine whether
14

or not to grant an extension, and any mistake about the deadline is attributable to
defendant or his attorney.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his pleas.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ _ f d a y of January, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

IS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Kent R. Hart,
attorney for defendant/appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorney for
defendant/appellant 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
czy^y

clay of January, 2004.
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Addendum A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
76-6-202. Burglary.

2002 Supplement

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B
1999 EDITION

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); or
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f), and which may be committed by the
actor while he is in the building.
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PER CURIAM
*1 Appellant Vear Brooks appeals the denial of a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and multiple
motions to correct an illegal sentence
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed
within thirty days after entry of the plea See Utah
Code Ann § 77-13-6 (1999) Brooks's guilty plea
was entered when he was sentenced on December 9,
1994 See State v Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 1f 11, 31 P
3d 528 (holdmg guilty plea entered when defendant
is sentenced) Failure to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea within thirty days of its entry
'extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal" State v Reyes,
2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P3d 630 The motion to
withdraw a guilty plea in this case was filed over six
years after its entry We lack jurisdiction to
consider an appeal from the denial of an untimely
Copr © West 2004 No Claim

motion to withdraw the guilty plea See id
In his motions to correct an illegal sentence, filed
pursuant to rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Brooks claims that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the
court did not comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure in acceptmg his guilty plea
The motions sought to collaterally challenge the
guilty plea and resulting conviction 'A request to
correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e)
presupposes a valid conviction" State v Brooks
908 P2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) Accordingly, "rule
22(e) does not allow a court to review a claim of an
illegal sentence when the substance of the claim is a
challenge to the underlying conviction" Id at
860-61, see also State v Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 7,
48 P 3d 228 ("[A] defendant may not employ rule
22(e) to attack the underlying conviction") The
assertion that rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure creates a jurisdictional
requirement for imposition of sentence is not
persuasive To the contrary, failure to make a timely
motion to withdraw a guilty plea extinguishes the
right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea See
State v Abeyta, 852 P 2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)
To the extent that Brooks challenges his sentence,
the record does not support his factual assertions
He was not sentenced to a minimum mandatory
term in this case The court sentenced him to an
indeterminate term of zero to five years on each of
two counts of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a
third degree felony The court ordered the terms to
run concurrently to each other and consecutively to
a sentence Brooks was then serving as a result of a
probation violation in a separate case The sentence
in this case was within the allowable range for the
third degree felony convictions The claim that
Brooks was denied an opportunity to review the
presentence report is raised for the first time on
appeal, and we do not consider it other than to note
that the record also reflects that counsel who
represented Brooks at sentencing had reviewed the
presentence report
*2 Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the
motions to withdraw the guilty plea and to correct
an illegal sentence
2003 WL 21282559 (Utah App), 2003 UT App 84
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PER CURIAM.
*1 Loran Elmo Swensen appeals from the denial of
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This case is
before the court on a sua sponte motion for
summary affirmance.
The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction
over the appeal because the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea was not timely filed in the district court.
However, Swensen filed a timely notice of appeal
following entry of the decision of the district court
denying the motion, and this court has appellate
jurisdiction to review that decision.

slip op. (Utah Ct.App. May 11, 1995).
In 1999, Swensen filed a motion to withdraw his
1994 guilty plea, contending it was not taken in
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and was involuntary. The
district court denied the motion both for lack of
merit and based upon its conclusion that M[t]he
defendant has shown no good cause to allow the
court to consider withdrawing his guilty pleas of 31
January 1994 more than thirty days after they were
entered."
We may affirm the trial court's judgment on any
proper ground, even though not relied upon below.
See Gardner v.Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 789 n. 2
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). A motion to withdraw a guilty
plea must be "made within 30 days after the entry of
the plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b)(1999).
In State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992), this court held that "[i]f a defendant
is informed of the statute's thirty-day deadline for
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, section
77-13-6(2)(b) is jurisdictional." Accordingly, "[i]f
the timeliness issue [is] properly addressed in the
trial court, that court [is] without jurisdiction to hear
defendant's motion and without a basis for
extending the time for defendant to file his motion."
Id
Because Swensen was advised of the thirty-day
deadline for making a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the untimely motion to
withdraw the guilty plea or to extend the time for
bringing a motion to withdraw. On that basis, we
affirm the district court's denial of the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.
The judgment is affirmed.
1999 WL 33244784 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 340

Swensen entered a guilty plea in January 1994 to
two counts of sexual abuse of a child, a second
degree felony. At the change of plea hearing, the
district court advised Swensen that any motion to
withdraw the guilty plea must be filed within thirty
days of entry of the guilty plea. Swensen did not file
a timely motion to withdraw, but filed a direct
appeal challenging his sentence. This court affirmed
the sentence in an unpublished memorandum
decision. See State v. Swensen, No. 940277-CA,
Copr. ©West 2004 No (
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( 1 ) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea
held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30
days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period
specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a,
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, e n a c t e d b y L.
1980, c h . 15, § 2; 1989, c h . 65, § 1; 1994, c h .
16, § 1; 2003, c h . 290, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsections (2Xa) and (2)(b) which, respectively, read
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with

leave of the court" and "A request to w i t h d r a w a
plea of guilty or no contest is m a d e by motion
and shall be made within 30 d a y s after the
entry of the plea", added Subsection (2)(c), and
deleted former Subsection (3) which r e a d "This
section does not restrict the rights of a n imprisoned person under Rule 65B, U t a h Rules of
Civil Procedure "

represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court i ne
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for tnal A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early tnal In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury tnal
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the nght to counsel and does not desire counsel,
(e)(2) the plea is voluntanly made,
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the nght to the presumption of innocence, the
nght against compulsory self-incnmination, the right to a speedy public tnal
before an impartial jury, the nght to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these nghts are waived,
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon tnal the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements,
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged cnme was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial nsk of conviction,
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences,
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a pnor plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached,
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea, and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the nght of appeal is limited
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a wntten statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions pnor to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea
(1) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the nght, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a heanng within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann § 77-16a-103
J J - « _ . — iv>f-« i IQQ«* Tammrvl 1996. November 1, 1997, Novem-
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2

JUDGE SHEILA K. MCCLEVE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

Sorry to keep you waiting so long.

5

MR. BIGGS:

It's alright, we needed the time.

Your

6

Honor, we've come to a disposition on this case and if we can

7

bring Mr. Quintana out I'll explain it to you.

8

This is Ray Quintana.

9

THE COURT:

10

We'll do appearances.

State v.

Raymond Michael Quintana.

11

MS. CAMERON:

12

MR. BIGGS:

13

Sure.

Anne Cameron for the State.
Your Honor, David Biggs, Legal Defender's

office for Mr. Quintana.

Mr. Quintana is present.

14

THE COURT:

Okay, go ahead.

15

MR. BIGGS:

Your Honor, in these particular two

16

matters what we've greed to do, Mr. Quintana has agreed to do

17

is plead to two second degree burglaries, one burglary out of

18

each file.

19

fingerprints were found.

20

maximum punishment as Mr. Quintana is aware is 1 to 15 in the

21

State Prison and a $10,000 fine plus an 85 percent sir charge.

22

I've gone over the elements of the offenses, Your Honor.

23

gone over the factual basis for the plea.

24

have also gone over all of his constitutional rights manifest

25

in the document which I'm referring to and incorporating by

Those burglaries being those burglaries which his
They are second degree felonies, the

I've

Mr. Quintana and I

1

reference and he is prepared to sign that in open court this

2

morning.

3
4

THE COURT:

Okay.

Tell me, is it Count 1 in case

ending 1211 because there's the -

5

MR. BIGGS:

They're all the same burglary language

6

but Ms. Cameron would like the victims to be particular victims

7

and she has the names.

8
9

THE COURT:

So in Count 1 it's Judith Cluff and in

Count 5 it's Jeff Fugate, I guess?

10

MS. CAMERON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. CAMERON:

No.
And then in Count 3 it's Leonard Reynold?
That is correct for 1211, ending 1211.

13

He is pleading guilty to - if you need a specific count for him

14

to plead guilty to?

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. CAMERON:

17

THE COURT:

18
19
20
21

I do.
It would be Count 1 Judith Cluff.
Okay, Count 1.

That's what I wanted to

know.
MS. CAMERON: I'd also like the other victims
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

That's fine.

That's fine.

And then in

22

case 1684, there's only the one second degree there and that's

23

Jim Stefan and Esther Stefan, right?

24

MS. CAMERON:

25

THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
Okay.

So do you understand that, Mr.

1

Quintana?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

Yes I do, Your Honor.

You would be in case ending 1684

4

admitting that you committed a second degree burglary at 780

5

East Loveland Avenue on or about September 23, 2002 and that

6

you entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Jim

7

Stephan and Esther Stefan with the intent to commit a theft.

8

You understand that?

9

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

And in case ending 1211, you would

11

be admitting that you at 5670 South Highland Drive, on or about

12

September 13 of 2002 entered or remained unlawfully in the

13

dwelling of Judith Cluff with the intent to commit a theft also

14

a second degree felony burglary and as Mr. Biggs said 1 to 15

15

on each.

16

run at the same time and you give up all those constitutional

17

rights you have to make the State bring in the witnesses, put

18

them on the stand, be able to have Mr. Biggs ask them

19

questions, have a jury for that matter decide your guilt or

20

innocense and to be able to appeal from any errors of law that

21

might be made.

22

you understand?

They can be added on top of each other rather than

All those constitutional rights that you en]oy,

23

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

24

THE COURT:

25

And you've talked with Mr. Biggs about

and you appreciate that you're giving those up?
3

1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

And that you are convicting

3

yourself, in other words, the same as if we went through the

4

trial and you were found guilty of those offenses I've ]ust

5

talked to you about.

6

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I realize that.

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

9

THE COURT:

10

You understand all of that, okay.

So you know what the penalties are. You

know what your rights are.

You know what the charges are.

11

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

12

THE COURT:

And other than what the attorneys have

13

told me, they haven't forced you into this or promised you

14

anything?

15

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

16

THE COURT:

17

You're not under the influence of any

medication, drugs, anything that would effect your judgment?

18

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

19

THE COURT:

20

So you know what you're doing, you know

what the charges are, you know what the penalties are.

21

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

22

THE COURT:

23

up.

And you understand the rights you give

You've been through how much school?

24

THE DEFENDANT: High school.

25

THE COURT:

Okay, enough that you can read and write?

1

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

2

THE COURT:

3

And you read through that form, went over

it, had a chance to ask Mr. Biggs any questions you had?

4

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

5

THE COURT:

So, to Count 1, case ending 1211,

6

burglary, second degree felony at 5670 South Highland Drive,

7

September 13, 2003 how do you plead?

8

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

In case ending 1684, burglary,

10

second degree felony at 780 East Loveland Avenue, September 23,

11

2002, how do you plead?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT: Okay.

Guilty, Your Honor.
We'll accept your guilty pleas to

14

both those counts and grant the State's motion to dismiss the

15

remaining counts?

16

MS. CAMERON: Thank you, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

And you can sign that if you haven't done

18

that already.

19

further evidence that you understand your rights and the

20

charges and the consequences or penalties to you.

21

until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for

22

good cause.

23
24
25

We'll have you execute that now and that will be

You have up

And I'm assuming we need pre-sentence report if for
nothing more than restitution amounts.
MR. BIGGS:

Let me tell you what we're asking the
5

1

Court to do.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. BIGGS:

Your Honor, in this particular matter,

4

Mr. Qumtana went to ]ury trial in another burglary under Jbdge

5

Reese, approximately a month ago and his sentencing is set for

6

Monday in front of Judge Reese.

7

already been prepared.

8

to Judge Reese for sentencing.

9

stipulate to the restitution on these matters and I don't thLrk

Pre-sentence report has

I am asking you to send these two cases
Mr. Qumtana agrees and will

10

that there's anything necessary needful to get on these

11

particular matters and Mr. Qumtana would like to get going.

12

So what we're asking the Court to do is send these two to Judge

13

Reese for sentencing although the other is set for Monday next.

14

MS. CAMERON:

I have no objection, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT: All right.

You've got to check with

16

Judge Reese.

17

Otherwise - do you want me to give you backup date just in

18

case?

19

I need to do it, if he doesn't feel like he wants to take it.

20

There's nothing that requires him to do that but he well may

21

and if he's willing to do it, he certainly can.

22
23
24
25

If he'll take it and do it, I'll send it to him.

And I would do an addendum to the pre-sentence report if

MR. BIGGS: Certainly, Your Honor.

Why don't you give

us a two week date then.
THE COURT:

What I expect is that he'll take it and

we'll just strike it so just pick a day.

Just so I don't lose
6

1

it we'll do it June 2nd at nine.

2

deliver this to his clerk if he'll just let us know he's

3

accepted it.

And I'll have my clerk

4

MR. BIGGS:

He's downstairs.

5

THE COURT:

He's down on three.

7

MR. BIGGS:

I'm going to go down there right now.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

6

9

He's on this same

wing.

And these are all your

witnesses?

10

MS. CAMERON: These are the witnesses.

11

THE COURT: I apologize to all of your for keeping you

12

waiting.

13

didn't do the trial anyway and hopefully it did it in a way

14

that you're all satisfied and we certainly appreciate your

15

participation and your patience and I guess Ms. Cameron will

16

speak to you further.

17
18

As I understand it, it resolved the matter so that we

You're all excused and we'll let you go.

And Mr. Quintana, I expect Judge Reese will do this
so good luck to you.

19

THE DEFENDANT: Alright, thank you.

20

THE COURT:

21

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

We'll excuse counsel on that.

22
23
24
25

-c-
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2003

2

JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

MR. BIGGS: Good morning, Your Honor, 26, 27 and 28.
Raymond Quintana who is in custody.

6
7

THE COURT:

deposition I believe on two others; is that right?

8
9

Set for sentencing on one case and a

MR. BIGGS:

Yes, sentencing on all three.

We've

already taken a plea on the other two.

10

THE COURT:

Oh, have you on the other two?

11

MR. BIGGS:

He's facing sentencing on three second

12

degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BIGGS: Alright.

15

THE COURT: State of Utah v. Raymond Michael Quintana,

16

We'll start with the felonies.

and that is your name, sir?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

The pre-sentence report that

19

I have addresses, of course, only the case that was in my

20

court.

21

I've understood, they're very similar, both burglaries, both

22

residential burglaries, second degree felonies and so you'd

23

like to be sentenced today on all three; is that correct?

I don't have any information on the other but from what

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

Mr. Biggs go ahead.

1

MR. BIGGS:

Your Honor, we received the pre-sentence

2

report and I've gone over the pre-sentence report with my

3

client.

4

Court's attention.

5

paragraph it talks about what I was going to talk about so I

6

will point out to you that Mr. Quintana has had a considerable

7

and lengthy drug problem, heroin, and he has, because of the

8

fact that he dropped out of high school, has very little in the

9

way of life skills.

A couple of things that I wanted to bring to the
On page 2, Your Honor, of 12, in the first

However, if you go further in the report,

10

Your Honor, you'll see that on page 9 of 12, in the last two

11

paragraphs he has a very good family support.

12

contacted and talked about how he behaves with his parent and

13

with his siblings and they also contacted Mark North who was

14

Mr. Quintana's last employer and talked about what a good

15

worker he was.

16

His mother was

Now the recommendation is for state prison and the

17

recommendation for state prison is based upon his prior

18

criminal history as noted in the pre-sentence report and, you

19

know, I feel like the last attorney that was up here, Manny was

20

talking about the fact that you've got an individual who has a

21

lengthy criminal history and Mr. Quintana does but in every

22

individual's life there is that point where they want to make

23

some substantial changes.

24
25

I don't know if the Court recalls the jury trial that
Mr. Quintana had in your Court but he was very respectful and
2

1

he was very involved in the case.

It didn't take very long.

2

It only took a day but throughout his entire criminal history,

3

that was the first jury trial he's ever had and he mentioned to

4

me afterwards how much he appreciated this Court, the

5

prosecutor and all the witnesses allowing him to participate in

6

that event, so much so that when we were set for jury trial in

7

about three weeks after your jury trial in front of Judge

8

McCleve, he just came to me and said, "Look I'll plead guilty,

9

I did them.

I'm not trying to make anybody's day any longer

10

than it has to be."

11

pre-sentence report is that he has had some serious and

12

significant problems with heroin.

13

But the one thing that is clear from this

Now, what to do about that?

Obviously, you as a

14

Judge, you have to weigh helping him with that problem with the

15

seriousness of the offenses and protecting society.

16

understands that but what we're hoping the Court will see in

17

Mr. Quintana by my representations is that he's getting up

18

there.

19

heroin addict and he doesn't want to die in prison and so he

20

really wants to make a change.

21

not suggesting probation because you're not going to give it

22

and he knows you're not going to give it.

23

suggestion and that would be the possibility of a 60 day

24

evaluation to determine whether or not he is serious about

25

trying to deal with his drug habit.

He

He's closing in on 50 and he doesn't want to die a

So what am I suggesting?

I'm

It's kind of a novel

3

1

If that's too novel a suggestion, then I would ask

2

the Court to run the three second degree felonies concurrently

3

and along with the Class B misdemeanor.

4

will set the time he has to spend in prison and because of his

5

prior prison commitments, he knows pretty much exactly what

6

he's facing as far as time is concerned but he wanted to tell

7

you - and I'll give him a minute to talk to you because he

8

wants to talk to you about his experience in your courtroom

9

that he really does want to make a change in his life.

The board obviously

He

10

thinks he is ready to make that change and I'm hoping that the

11

prison or this Court will give him the opportunity to do that.

12

THE COURT:

13

Ms. Cameron did you have any recommendations?

14

MS. CAMERON:

15

THE COURT:

16
.17

All right.

I do, Your Honor.
You represent the State on all three of

these cases?
MS. CAMERON:

I do.

Just a little bit of background

18

on Mr. Quintana's cases.

We did have one jury trial that was

19

in this courtroom, he did have the finding of guilty.

20

other case, well, there were two cases that were actually set

21

for trial last week.

22

waive the trial.

23

cases until the morning of trial which was last Thursday.

24

were set for two bench trials in a row.

25

the preliminary hearing on one of those cases.

Mr. Quintana waived his ]ury.

The

He didn't

He didn't determine to plead guilty on those
We

Your Honor, did hear
It was
4

1

originally charged with 22 counts, 11 burglaries.

2

In examining the evidence and in the interest of

3

judicial economy I determined that I only wanted to charge

4

three of those burglaries and the three thefts that went with

5

them.

6

and tortured.

7

at the ADC telling me that they had heard that he had tortured

8

that cat.

9

portion of it when I went down to have his fingerprints re-

I did not include the burglary where a cat was killed
How I connect Mr. Qumtana to that is by people

There were dogs that were terrorized.

Also another

10

inked for the comparison, he indicated to the fingerprint

11

technician that he does file off the palm of his hand,

12

including the fingerprints because of some weightliftmg

13

callouses that would not include filing off his fingerprints.

14

It took Karen seven attempts to get one fingerprint rolled.

15

Given that plus some of the comments included in the

16

pre-sentence report on page 2 where the pre-sentence report

17

investigator indicates that he appears to lack even those basic

18

abilities needed to function on a daily basis outside of prison

19

and that you cannot overlook the danger he presents to the

20

community and to himself with his heroin addiction.

21

that when he was in the juvenile detention center he actually

22

escaped with the use of a firearm at one point when he was a

23

juvenile and then his very, very lengthy history of adult crime

24

at the, I think it is page 6 of the report indicates that he

25

has been incarcerated since March 1997 and July 2000.

The fact

He was
5

1

on parole eight times and each time unsuccessfully failed to

2

comply and in the four years and seven months that he was

3

outside of prison, just from reading the pre-sentence report,

4

it seems that he was picked up on, I think 19 felonies.

5

a danger to the community.

6

He is

I did, in our agreement on the two cases that we

7

settled last Thursday, agree to recommend that those two, 1 to

8

15 year sentences run concurrent with each other.

9

further recommendation to this Court that those two sentences

It is my

10

run consecutive to the sentence for the trial that he had in

11

here.

12

in any way that he wishes to change what he does.

13

his fingerprints so we can't find

14

scene, animals are tortured when he is there and he continues

15

to burglarize and victimize people in the community.

He is a danger to the community.

He has not indicated
He files off

- they are not left at the

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

And now Mr. Biggs, if you have something else to say

18
19

and if not Mr. Quintana I'll give you the last word.
MR. BIGGS:

Your Honor, just a couple of

20

clarifications.

Mr. Quintana vehemently denies ever torturing

21

any animal.

22

spare him the opportunity of saying that and secondly, it's

23

amazing how things get - they were trying to take his

24

fingerprints and she said in jest, "Boy, this, you know, we're

25

having difficulty doing this."

He was never convicted of that, and so I'll just

And he goes, "Yeah, when I was
r

O

1

in prison, I weight lifted and I used to get calluses on my

2

palms of my hands and I would file off those palms."

3

never, ever indicated that he was filing off his fingerprints

4

for the purposes of not being detected.

5

that as it may, I think Mr. Quintana has something he'd like to

6

say.

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

But he

But at any rate, be

Sure, go ahead.
At this time I would like to express

my deepest apologies to those I have hurt and victimized by my

10

acts.. I am sorry and truly regret what I have done.

11

I offended them people as well as shamed and embarrassed myself

12

and my family.

13

I can't.

14

you that if there is any way possible that I can attempt to

15

make up for what I've done, that I truly will.

16

I realize

I wish I could take it back what I've done, but

All I can do is ask for your forgiveness and assure

I would like the Court to try and understand my

17

reasoning at the time for my acts in hopes that I can receive

18

the help I do desperately need.

19

bank.

20

was due.

21

much stress and depression on myself that I relapsed back into

22

using heroin to take away the pain and escape reality.

23

happened in a two month period.

24

was addicted again and I couldn't go to a detox or a drug

25

program because you needed money to do so.

I had come in debt with the

I was behind on my car payments.

I lost my job, rent

My world was falling out from under me.

I had so

This

Not only was I in debt but I

7

1

Unless you've been addicted to heroin, you won't

2

fully understand the sickness you go through.

3

soul if you have to to get well.

4

of 16.

5

incarcerated my whole life behind my drug addiction and I've

6

never been given a chance to get the proper treatment I need.

7

In prison the programs are limited.

8

space only and is not a deterrent for me.

9

the Court to realize this and please help.

I've been using since th-2 age

I don't know how to break the cycle.

I've been

It's a warehouse for bed

10

cycle.

11

stable and build a foundation for myself.

12

program.

13

program that can help me.

14

You'll sell your

This is where I ask
I need to break the

I need to overcome my addiction and learn how to be
I need a treatment

I've heard a lot about the Odyssey House.

It's a

What I long to be is a productive part of society,

15

somebody with a life of their own not a slave to drugs.

16

hope is you will hear my pleas and allow me one chance, ]ust

17

one chance to make the change.

18

necessary to make up for what I've done and at the same time

19

get the help I need.

20

time may not be the answer.

21

My

I'm willing to do whatever is

Allow me to do this, to go to prison and

The Odyssey House is a good program, Your Honor, and

22

you know, it's the last chance for me I feel at living a normal

23

life.

24

the victims and ask, again, to get help.

25

Once again, I sincerely apologize to the Court and to

THE COURT:

Okay.

Counsel, one thing I should have
8

1

asked, is the complaining witness, has she been given notice?

2

Is she here today, have any comments?

3

MS. CAMERON:

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. CAMERON:

On that (inaudible)?
Well, I guess on any of them.
I know the witnesses and victims from

6

Thursday's case are aware that we were going to do this today

7

and I'm quite sure our office made sure that the victim for

8

your case.

9

I didn't see her here.

Are any of the victims present?

10

THE COURT:

It would appear not.

11

I'm prepared to go forward, Mr. Quintana.

Your

12

attorney really hit it on the head with his first comments.

13

job is to try to balance the need to protect our community and

14

at the same time, if we can rehabilitate you and if those can

15

be done together then so much the better but as I look at your

16

record here and I see the felonies you've been convicted of

17

before this, including I think four other burglaries as an

18

adult.

19

- or were convicted of burglarizing again, and I think of those

20

victims, my concern is that probation would not insure the

21

protection that I want to make sure we have here, and so I am

22

going to put you in prison.

23

My

When I look at the number of homes that you've admitted

On the case ending 2390, the burglary, a second

24

degree felony, I'll impose the indeterminate term of 1 to 15

25

years in the Utah State Prison.

There was a theft conviction
9

1
2

as well but I'll impose no sentence on that.
For the case ending 1684 burglary, a second degree

3

felony, again, 1 to 15 years in prison and I am going to impose

4

those sentences to run consecutively because of the fact that

5

you have such a lengthy record and again in my judgment

6

a significant threat to our community.

7

you're

And finally in the last case, 1211, burglary, a

8

second degree felony, the sentence would be again 1 to 15 years

9

in prison and I'll impose that sentence again to run

10

consecutively with the sentences in the other two cases.

11

aware of the State's recommendation but again, it's my judgment

12

that that's an appropriate sentence given your record and the

13

number of homes that you've burglarized in our community.

14

Mr. Quintana, that's my sentence.

15

MR. BIGGS:

I'm

So

Your Honor, could he receive a

16

recommendation for receiving credit for the 202 days he's

17

alreadv served?

^.Hereupon z* e ^-a ..d

_ o ^:4.

,z,^^,

21
22
23
24
25
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Robin W.
Reese was transcribed by me from a video recording and is a
full, true and correct transcription of the requested
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Addendum F

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ANNE A. CAMERON, 8865
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

MAY 2 7 2003

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case Nos. 021911684
g2t9Tj2rr>

-vs-

RAYMOND MICHAEL QUTNTANA,
Hon. Sheila K. McCleve
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas in the above referenced cases is denied.
The defendant's motion is untimely as it was not made prior to his sentencing as required by
Utah Code Annotated §77-13-6.

Q

DATED thisjfthday of May, 2003.
BY THE;

ORDER
Case No. 021911684
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to
David C. Biggs, Attorney for Defendant Raymond Michael Quintana, at 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the >** day of May, 2003.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

O&IMbMF*

IfymtNk A). Ait//fTX*f4
Defendant.
, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:

I,

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree
.

A.

IT /

f4 '*0&9fti£Mf&

B.

D

M M

6ft

C.

D.

1

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

A

,/^/^g +*£%!

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me, I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

gjjgg

/>v^

4 A*4<>

^f

&U%

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

2

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I(ffiave ngt) (b*w^ waived m\ rights to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel. I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

is fij/lh ? &ff$
If I have not waived my rights to counsel, my attorney is
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement. m\ rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I ha\e a right to a speed) and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be gi\ ing up that right b\ pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a ) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right !• , n attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who teitifuJ against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial. I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those cost.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I w ere to
have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest). I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me. I need only plead "not guilty."
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving
3

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty. I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (859£) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or aw aiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest). my^tmtyltyr no content^Teays^iow may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. Ifthe offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below: M
.
.
M *
M
JAJ

JTrial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am VJ years of age. I have attended school through the /&
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

5

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) pleats), I must
file a written notion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this _i£rday of

"^)r

2£Q*.

DEFENDANT

v

Certificate of Defense Attorney
, the defendant
I certify that I am the attorney for.TfovHtrttP ft\* Attire,
above, and that I know he/she has read the\ statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

ATTORNEY F O T T ^ V D A N T
Bar N o . ^ f c V

6

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify th&I anythe attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
tyfy/Effrv^ /top(U*&pa\
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
ancyfind that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Bar No. _ ^ & ^

7

Hrv

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in this Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this V

day of

8

